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FOREIGN LOBBYING AS AN INSTRUMENT  
OF DEFENSE COOPERATION BETWEEN POLAND  
AND THE UNITED STATES
V. N. Konyshev 
E. M. Skvortsova
St Petersburg State University
7—9 Universitetskaya emb., St Petersburg, 199034, Russia
Defence cooperation between Poland and the United States significantly affects the secu-
rity agenda of Russia, the Baltic region, and Europe as a whole. On the one hand, Poland 
intends to become a key partner of the US in ensuring European security. On the other 
hand, it has ambitions to take the leading position in the security area among the Baltic 
States. The Polish leadership sees an additional advantage in expanding military cooper-
ation with the United States, regarding it as a jumping board to accelerating its economic 
and technological development. This article examines a mechanism underlying defence 
cooperation between the US and Poland, i.e. lobbying Poland’s interests in another state. 
This allows Warsaw to actively promote its interests in the US. The research methodology 
employed includes the periodisation of Polish lobbying activities in the US and an em-
pirical study of lobbying based on analysis of original documents, many of which have 
been analysed for the first time. It is shown that, under the existing party system, Poland 
will not abandon strategic partnership with the United States, primarily in security and 
defence. Over the study period, Poland quickly gained experience in promoting its in-
terests in the US through direct lobbying, showing flexibility in negotiations, relying on 
the two-party support in the US Congress, successfully coordinating the activities of its 
governing bodies and various corporations which are submitted to tight state control.
Keywords:  
foreign lobbying, USA, Poland, defence cooperation
Introduction
After the end of the Cold War, the conflict potential in relations between Po-
land and Russia manifests itself in various dimensions [1]. Modern Poland’s se-
curity policy is of particular interest against the background of troubled relations 
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between Russia and the Baltic countries as well of the decline in Russia’s inter-
action with the West in general [2, p. 5]. It is important that the impetus for the 
new waves of escalation is often provided by the USA, which is supported by 
the Baltic states and Poland [3, p. 28, 33]. The peculiarity of Poland lies in the 
fact that in recent years it has been trying to build relations with the USA as a 
higher priority comparing to ties with EU and NATO partners. Moreover, Warsaw 
demonstrates its ambitions to become regional leader in security issues [4, p. 170; 
5, p. 147—148]. This directly affects Russia’s hard security interests in the Baltic 
region and in Europe as a whole [6].
However, there is a wider perspective of bilateral cooperation with the US, 
which Poland is primarily interested in. It explains the very active efforts of the 
Polish leadership to give new impetus to Polish-American relations, choosing 
military security issues as a lever and even pursuing a joint European security 
policy in partnership with the United States [7, p. 67]. According to the senti-
ments of some Polish elites, intensification of military cooperation will contribute 
to closer economic ties between Poland and the United States.
Having recently entered the arsenal of Polish foreign policy, lobbyism is be-
coming an important instrument for such activity. Since the 2000s, Poland has 
been gradually developing its experience of working with American lobbying 
companies to advance its interests in the corridors of the executive and legisla-
tive branches of the United States government. A study of the main approaches 
to lobbying helps to clarify Poland’s priorities in cooperation with the United 
States, the problems of bilateral relations and their future prospects. Meanwhile, 
lobbyism as an instrument of Poland’s foreign policy is not well understood. This 
article explores how Poland uses the mechanism of foreign lobbyism in the Unit-
ed States to deepen bilateral cooperation, primarily in the military field.
The study used institutional analysis to explore the structure, functions, and 
role of foreign lobbying in promoting military-technical cooperation between Po-
land and the USA; the method of periodization was used to identify stages in the 
development of Polish lobbyism in the corridors of US power; and the method of 
concrete historical analysis was used for a comprehensive study of lobbying prac-
tices basing on original documents, many of which are introduced into scientific 
discourse for the first time.
Lobbying mechanism for promoting Polish interests in the USA
Today the institute of lobbying is an ingrained part of the American political 
system [8, p. 107]. This institution serves as an intermediary between the client 
(who can be a private person, a public or a civic organization, a business struc-
ture) on the one hand, and US authorities on the other hand. It is important that 
both American and foreign political actors can serve as a client. 
Lobbyists help to promote the interests of the client in the corridors of power, 
acting within the framework of special legislation, which is designed to ensure 
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transparency of the lobbying process and thereby prevent corruption. According 
to a number of laws of 1938, 1946, 1995 and 20071, lobbying organizations are 
required to register with the Department of Justice and the US Congress, as well 
as regularly submit reports on the scope and content of their activities, funds 
received and information about their client [9]. The number of lobbyists speaks 
eloquently about the magnitude of the practice: Washington alone has over 10 
thousand registered lobbyists [10]. Rare congressional law is passed without 
amendments introduced by them. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a signif-
icant increase in lobbying costs, as businesses expect to earn additional profits 
by interacting with political power rather than from the principle of “free hands” 
[11, p. 7—13]. The staff of lobbyists consists mainly of lawyers, former officials, 
politicians and other people with extensive ties in government and business. 
The lobbyists use a very wide set of tools and techniques to exercise influ-
ence. For example, in addition to personally persuading Members of Congress 
(MOCs), lobbyists would offer assistance in drafting bills and analyzing issues, 
help in working with voters, financial support during election campaign, insider 
information, patronage after the end of public service. Influence is also achieved 
by indirect methods — through closest friends and relatives, celebrities from the 
MOC’s state, and even parish priests, or by organizing the necessary activity of 
voters of a district, and so on. It is not surprising that the attitude to the institution 
of lobbyism is ambiguous, since the actions of lobbyists sometimes go beyond the 
law, and their goal is to impose corporate interest on the authorities. On the other 
hand, lobbyists help official authorities to take into account the needs of various 
interest groups more accurately. In addition, in the United States phenomenon of 
corruption and lobbying are separated at the legislative level, while professional 
lobbyist associations regularly monitor compliance with the rules and ethics [12].
Foreign lobbyism plays a special role in the American politics as it allows 
foreign principals to influence decision-making at the level of federal authorities. 
Foreign lobbying addresses a wide range of issues, but the US law strongly re-
stricts political propaganda [13, p. 18]. Many states and foreign non-state actors 
are using this lobbying mechanism [14—16]. According to the U.S. Department 
of Justice, lobbyists represented 665 foreign clients in the first half of 20182.
Since 1944 Polish interests on the issues of military security have been rep-
resented in the United States by the public organization of the Polish diaspora, 
the Polish American Congress [17], whose mission was revised after successfully 
lobbying Poland’s joining NATO [18, p. 78, 81]. Since 2008, Warsaw has been 
1 Foreign Agents Registration Act, Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, Lobbying Disclo-
sure Act, Honest Leadership and Open Government Act.
2 Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration 
of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, for the six months ending June 
30, 2018 // U.S. Department of Justice. P. 3 URL: https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/
file/1194051/download (access date: 26.11.2019).
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using the services of American lobbyists to promote military cooperation of the 
two states. At the same time Polish society remains quite conservative with re-
gard to lobbying activity and largely associates lobbying with corruption (accord-
ing to polls in 2016, 56% of Poles called lobbying a negative phenomenon), and 
the lobbying institution in Poland itself is not developed much, although the law 
on its regulation was adopted back in 2005 [19]. According to some estimates, 
only about 370 lobbyists are registered in Poland [20, p. 9].
The practice of Poland’s appeal to the services of American lobbyists greatly 
depends on the understanding of the ruling party’s security policy and the content 
of partnership with the United States. During the reign of the “Civil Platform” 
(CP) in 2011-2014, no contract was signed for lobbying in the US in the military 
field. Despite the fact that CP favors developing strategic partnership with the 
United States, the party is considering relations with the United States as part 
of a two-tier security model. The first and main tier is represented by relations 
between the EU and NATO, and the second — by bilateral cooperation between 
European countries and the United States, which includes Polish-American co-
operation as an integral part [21]. CP considers the United States primarily as an 
economic partner, and advocates the expansion of the American investment as 
well as its technological and intellectual presence in Poland3.
Conversely, lobbying activity has increased during the years of the rule of 
the “Law and Justice“(L&J) party, which came to power in 2015. This party em-
phasizes the importance of national sovereignty and is gradually moving away 
from cooperation within NATO and the EU in favor of bilateral relations with the 
United States considered the main guarantor of Poland’s security [22]. The party 
has announced its intention to deploy US and NATO military facilities on Polish 
territory4. As a result, 2/3 of US troops, military depots in Eastern Europe, and 
most of their headquarters are stationed in Poland [23, с.180]. The strategic goals 
of L&J imply giving a powerful impetus to Polish-American relations through a 
joint security policy in the European region based on shared interests5.
It is not surprising that in recent years Poland has been showing increased 
interest in lobbying in the United States precisely in the field of military coopera-
tion. Since 2008, nine contracts have been signed with lobbying organizations to 
promote issues of military security and cooperation, including 5 contracts during 
2015—2018 (Table 1). 
3 Następny krok. Razem. Program wyborczy Platformy Obywatelskiej, 2011.
4 Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Warszawa, 
2011.
5 Zdrowie — Praca — Rodzina. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, 2014.
8 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Table 1
Poland contracts for lobbying in the US
Year Number of contracts
Contracts on military cooperation and defense 
according to services 
Lobbying Consulting on US policy
2008 4 1 No
2009 4 2 No
2010 3 1 No
2016 4 2 No
2017 4 No 1
2018 (half year) 7 No 2
Poland has mainly been using the services of the two lobbying organizations 
BGR Government Affairs Limited Liability Company (BGR) and Park Strategies 
Limited Liability Company (Park Strategies) as well individual lobbyists. At the 
same time, BGR got more than 70% of contracts6 (Table 2).
Table 2
US companies / lobbyists hired to promote Poland’s military interests
Year Companies/lobbyists ForeignPrincipal Costs, $ 
2008 BGR Poland Embassy in the U.S. 10 150 000
2009 BGR Poland Embassy in the U.S. 34 140 236
2010 BGR Poland Embassy in the U.S. 30 83 300
2016 Park Strategies PGZ* 18 000 000 
2017 BGR PGZ 21 000 000
2018 BGR PGZ 12 000 000 (half year)
2018 John Holl-jr. POLSA** 12,000.00 (half year)
Remarks: * PGZ — Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (Polish Group of Weapons); 
** POLSA — Polska Agencja Kosmiczna (Polish Space Agency).
From the Polish side, only government bodies and state-owned companies 
were the principals of lobbying services. In 2008-2010 the first four contracts 
with lobbyists were signed by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in the Unit-
ed States, but after 2016 the situation has changed. Instead of the Embassy, the 
Polish Arms Group (PGZ) holding became the main principal in the contracts. 
The establishment of a unified defense holding which included more than 60 
companies7 contributed to the strengthening of the national defense industry [24] 
by improving coordination of defense enterprises, preventing competition in the 
domestic market between their manufacturers, and increasing the confidence of 
6 FARA Reports to Congress. The United States Department of Justies. URL: https://www.
justice.gov/nsd-fara/fara-reports-congress (access date: 01.12.2019).
7  Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa SA — PGZ SA. URL: http://pgzsa.pl/ (access date: 02.12.2019).
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foreign partners8. This had a positive effect on the practice of lobbying of Poland 
defense interests. In 2018, the Polish Space Agency (POLSA) also used lobbying 
services. The Agency supports the Polish space industry by deepening coopera-
tion with the American academic and business communities9.
However, regardless of who acts as the principal of contracts, lobbying in 
military cooperation is being realized under the strong control of the Polish gov-
ernment and primarily pursues national rather than private interests.
The first stage of Poland lobbying activities:  
ballistic missile defense and armed forces modernization
The history of Polish lobbying in the field of military security and defense 
can be divided into two periods. The first one lasted from 2008 to 2010 when 
the Embassy of the Republic of Poland realized four contracts with the lobbying 
company BGR. Contracts with total amount of $473 73510 stipulated the develop-
ment of recommendations about US foreign and military policy towards Poland, 
the establishment of meetings between Polish and American officials, and the 
promotion of Poland’s interests in the US Congress and executive bodies11.
Key directions of this activity were ballistic missile defense (BMD), mod-
ernization of the Polish armed forces, and defense cooperation. Negotiations on 
the deployment of BMD defense facilities in Poland began in 2007 [25, p. 43]. 
Initial results of Polish-American BMD-cooperation were promising. In 2008, the 
countries signed the Declaration on Strategic Cooperation12 and the Agreement 
on the deployment of BMD interceptors in Poland13. For bilateral interaction, spe-
cial working groups were created to discuss BMD issues: the Advisory Group on 
Strategic Cooperation between the United States and Poland14 and the Top Level 
Team on Security15.
8 Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa z szansą na sukces? URL: https://www.defence24.pl/pols-
ka-grupa-zbrojeniowa-z-szansa-na-sukces (access date: 14.11.2019).
9 Polska Agencja Kosmiczna. O POLSA. URL: https://polsa.gov.pl/o-agencji/o-polsa (access 
date: 16.11.2019).
10 FARA Reports to Congress. The United States Department of Justice. URL: https://www.
justice.gov/nsd-fara/fara-reports-congress (access date: 18.12.2019).
11 Constilting Services Agreement between Embassy of the Republic of Poland and BGR 
Government Affairs, LLC, 28.05.2008. URL: https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5430-Exhib-
it-AB-20080528-28.pdf (access date: 18.12.2019).
12 Deklaracja w sprawie współpracy strategicznej między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Stanami 
Zjednoczonymi Ameryki, Warszawa, 20.08.2008
13 Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rządem Stanów Zjednoczonych 
Ameryki dotycząca rozmieszczenia na terytorium Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej antybalistyc-
znych obronnych rakiet przechwytujących, August 20, 2008 (effective as of September 15, 
2011). URL: https://traktaty.msz.gov.pl/treaty-1 (access date: 11.10.2019).
14 Deklaracja w sprawie współpracy strategicznej między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Stanami 
Zjednoczonymi Ameryki, Warszawa, 20.08.2008
15 US — Poland Strategic Dialogue // U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in action. URL: 
https://2009—2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/150364.htm (access date: 20.11.2019)
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Although the Bush administration had a positive attitude towards the deploy-
ment of BMD elements in Poland, attempts of the Polish authorities to include the 
modernization of the Polish Air Force in these agreements caused a sharp neg-
ative reaction in the White House. Warsaw looked on additional increase in the 
national defense capability if Polish air forces could be integrated in American 
BMD system [26, p. 123]. However, this project failed. Apparently, the Polish 
leadership was not able to correctly set the task for the American lobbyists, since 
in reality the activity of BGR was mainly focused on the deployment of BMD 
elements. Moreover, Warsaw was forced to quickly accept American conditions 
with regard to the beginning of the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008, 
which caused serious concerns of the Polish leadership [27, p. 206]. During the 
signing ceremony, a declaration of US military assistance in the case of “a third 
state” attack on Poland was hastily announced16.
Obviously, the BGR could not foresee risks associated with the change in 
Barack Obama’s course in deploying BMD in Europe, possibly having no timely 
access to the necessary insider information. As a result, Poland faced the fact of 
the new US administration in 2009 unilaterally revising the BMD deployment 
policy [28, p. 9]. The US European Phased Adaptive Approach envisaged deploy-
ing BMD elements in four phases17. This meant the cancellation of the deploy-
ment of ground-based interceptors and X-band radars agreed upon with Warsaw 
in Central Europe. The activities of the Advisory Group on Strategic Cooperation 
were also frozen.
It should be noted that, according to reports on lobbying activities, BGR placed 
the main emphasis on promoting the interests of Poland in the executive branch. 
Lobbyists met with officers of the State Department, Department of Defense, and 
the National Security Council18. They would pay special attention to contacts with 
American military, but the meetings were not regular, and contact persons from 
the American side would often change. By 2010, meetings of lobbyists with rep-
resentatives of executive bodies had practically ceased due to a shift in the official 
position of the United States19.
As for the legislature, the BGR worked with congressmen from two House 
committees: the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Armed Forces Committee, 
16 US and Poland sign missile defense agreement. 20.08.2008// «Kommersant». URL: http://
www.kommersant.ru/doc/1013808 (access date: 10.11.2019). 
17 Obama abandons missile defence shield in Europe. 17.09.2009 // The Guardian. URL: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/17/missile-defence-shield-barack-obama (ac-
cess date: 22.11.2019).
18 Supplemental Statement Pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938, as amended For Six Month Period Ending. Nov. 30. 2008. URL: https://efile.fara.gov/
docs/5430-Supplemental-Statement-20081223—18.pdf (access date: 20.11.2019).
19 Supplemental Statement Pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938, as amended For Six Month Period Ending. May 31. 2010. URL: https://efile.fara.gov/
docs/5430-Supplemental-Statement-20100630-21.pdf (access date: 20.11.2019).
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but such contacts were episodic with the exception of Republicans Roger Zach-
eim and Kari Bingen (both of them held positions in the office of the US Secretary 
of Defense over the years) throughout 200920. Lobbyists held personal meetings 
with Congressman Mark Kirk’s assistants, but no contact was recorded with the 
Congressman himself. In the Senate, the number of personal meetings was great-
er, but all of them took place with the assistants of the Senators. Lobbyists tried to 
establish interaction with the Republicans Jon Kyl, Jimmy DeMint, George Voi-
novich, Christopher Smith21. Only in 2010, lobbyists achieved a personal meeting 
with Jon Kyl, but this had no an effect because Democrat Barak Obama came 
to power. The lobbyists’ bet on the Republican Party alone was fundamentally 
wrong, and in 2010 they changed their tactics by contacting the office of the 
Democratic Senator Mike Quigley22.
Summing up, the activities of the lobbying company of this period were not 
justified  in terms of political targets and in reality, adaptation to the new condi-
tions on BMD deployment in Europe took place through official bilateral contacts 
rather than through lobbying efforts. As a result, in 2010, the dialogue between 
the United States and Poland resumed and the work of the Advisory Group on 
Strategic Cooperation was re-launched23. A Protocol was adopted to amend the 
Agreement on the deployment of interceptor missiles in Poland24.
Thus, at the first stage of lobbying activity the lack of experience in orga-
nizing lobbying and the domestic situation inside Poland did not contribute to 
the timely correction of the negotiating position. The lobbying mechanism for 
promoting national interests was not adequately demanded by Polish authori-
20  Supplemental Statement Pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
of 1938, as amended For Six Month Period Ending. May 31. 2009. URL: https://efile.fara.
gov/docs/5430-Supplemental-Statement-20090630-19.pdf (access date: 20.11.2019); Supple-
mental Statement Pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as 
amended For Six Month Period Ending. Nov. 30. 2009. https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5430-Sup-
plemental-Statement-20091222-20.pdf (access date: 20.11.2019)
21 Supplemental Statement Pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
of 1938, as amended For Six Month Period Ending. May 31. 2009. URL: https://efile.
fara.gov/docs/5430-Supplemental-Statement-20090630-19.pdf (access date: 20.11.2019); 
Supplemental Statement Pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 
as amended For Six Month Period Ending. Nov. 30. 2009. https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5430-
Supplemental-Statement-20091222-20.pdf (access date: 20.11.2019)
22 Supplemental Statement Pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938, as amended For Six Month Period Ending. May 31. 2010. URL: https://efile.fara.gov/
docs/5430-Supplemental-Statement-20100630-21.pdf (access date: 20.11.2019).
23 Poland-US bilateral relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Po-
land. URL: https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/c/MOBILE/foreign_policy/other_continents/north_
america/bilateral_relations/test3 (access date: 25.11.2019)
24 Protokół zmieniający Umowę między Rządem RP a Rządem St. Zjedn. Ameryki dotyczącą 
rozmieszczenia na terytorium RP antybalistycznych obronnych rakiet przechwytujących, 
sporządzoną w Warszawie dnia 20 sierpnia 2008 r. URL: https://traktaty.msz.gov.pl/treaty-1 
(access date: 22.11.2019).
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ties [29, p. 205]. Weak coordination of the Polish institutions, changes in the 
political situation in the United States and the uncertainty for Poland also led to 
failures in lobbying.
The second stage in the evolution of lobbying:  
expanding cooperation
After a pause in lobbyism related to the reign of the CP party, the L&J wins 
again in 2016, and the second stage of Poland lobbying activity began. Warsaw 
tried to learn from the past mistakes. The PGZ holding decided to sign the first 
contract with lobbying company Park Strategies as the main principal instead of 
previous BGR. The change of the traditional partner was explained by sentiments 
in the Polish leadership that saw the reasons for the political failures of 2009-
2010 including questionable performance of BGR, although arguably, much larg-
er contribution to the failures came about as a result of the change in the foreign 
policy positions of Obama administration [30]. Indirectly, BGR’s high reputation 
in Washington also supports the organization’s quality work.25.
Since 2016, Park Strategies represented the interests of the Polish principals 
in the US Congress. Lobbyists provided a wide range of services:
— supporting Poland security initiatives, including increasing financial obli-
gations before NATO and developing NATO infrastructure in Poland;
— promoting a positive image of bilateral relations in the media, in particular 
on security in Eastern Europe, as well as explanation of Poland official and busi-
ness circles policy for American media;
— ensuring coordination of US and Polish policies ahead of the 2016 NATO 
Warsaw Summit;
— assisting in deepening cooperation between the American and Polish mili-
tary-industrial complex;
— organizing meetings at the level of the Atlantic Council, Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies, Council on Foreign Relations;
— holding meetings with MOCs and other authorities to support Polish stra-
tegic initiatives26.
Lobbyists managed to establish cooperation with MOCs on issues such as 
meetings with Minister of Defense Anthony Matsarevich to discuss political rela-
tions between Poland and the United States and NATO, expanding Polish-Ameri-
can cooperation on military issues, future participation of Polish delegation in the 
conference on countering ISIS, promotion military assistance to Poland through 
NATO. 
25 BGR History. URL: https://www.bgrdc.com/bgr-history.html (access date: 23.11.2019). 
26 Constilting Services Agreement between Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa S.A. and Park Strat-
egies. LLC. 22.04.2016. URL: https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6350-Exhibit-AB-20160422-1.pdf 
(access date: 23.11.2019).
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During the meeting with President Donald Trump, lobbyists emphasized how 
responsively Poland follows financial obligations to NATO to increase expenses. 
In addition, in interviews with Defense News and Newsmax Media they demon-
strate again Poland’s commitment to NATO values. Actual issues of Polish na-
tional security were also discussed with representatives of the Lugar Center27. 
Lobbyists Alphonse D’Amato, Craig Siracusa and John Zagame were respon-
sible for interacting with the government officials. Personal meetings were held 
with Republican Chairman John McCain and two members of the House of Rep-
resentatives, Democrat Dan Lipinski, the co-chairmen of the Polish Caucus of the 
US Congress28, and Republican Chris Gibson29.
In general, the collaboration with Park Strategies was successful and paid off. 
The Polish leadership was able to gain US political support during the Warsaw 
NATO summit. However, it is worth paying attention to the general favorable po-
litical background: the improvement of Polish-American relations was facilitated 
by Trump coming to power, with many of Obama’s foreign policy objectives 
being reviewed, including those related to the BMD problem in Europe.
Yet, despite the good results, the activity of American lobbyists received an 
ambiguous assessment in the Seimas30, primarily  due to the contract for the ac-
quisition of American Black Hawk helicopters negotiated by Park Strategies . 
Criticism of this contract was caused by the fact that the L&J party, which had 
come to power, refused to purchase Eurocopter EC725 Caracal helicopters from 
France, which had won the tender. The tender was announced again but with the 
only supplier, meaning that the contract would be signed with the United States 
rather than France. 
The Seimas repeatedly raised the issue of providing the government with 
confirmation of how urgent the acquisition of helicopters for the needs of the 
national defense was, since L&J representatives continuously referred to it in 
justification. But the ruling party never brought convincing arguments in favor of 
its decision. Following this, the Minister of Defense Matsarevich was accused of 
being unscrupulous with regard to the contract concluded with the USA. Accord-
ing to Caesar Tomczyk, a member of the Seimas National Defense Committee, 
27 Supplemental Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amend-
ed For Six Month Period Ending 10/31/2016. URL: https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6350-Supple-
mental-Statement-20161130-1.pdf (access date: 25.11.2019).
28 Lofgren Z., Davis R. Congressional Member Organizations (CMOs) // Committee on House 
Administration, 116th Congress, United States House of Representatives. Revised June 2019. 
P. 88. URL: https://cha.house.gov/sites/democrats.cha.house.gov/files/documents/cmo_cso_
docs/116th%20CMOs_06-03-2019.pdf (access date: 25.11.2019).
29 Supplemental Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amend-
ed For Six Month Period Ending 10/31/2016. URL: https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6350-Supple-
mental-Statement-20161130—1.pdf (access date: 25.11.2019). 
30 Wypowiedzi na posiedzeniach Sejmu, Posiedzenie nr 28 w dniu 20-10-2016 (2. dzień 
obrad) // Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. URL: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/wypow-
iedz.xsp?posiedzenie=28&dzien=2&wyp=060 (access date: 25.11.2019).
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representing the opposition party CP, lobbyist D’Amato worked simultaneously 
with Polish PGZ and the American Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMCO). Due 
to these circumstances, he had no right to represent the Ministry of Defense of 
Poland because of a conflict of interest.31 The situation resulted in serious inves-
tigation and subsequent resignation of Matsarevich32, following offenses detected 
in the activities of PGZ and its subsidiaries33.
After the anti-corruption investigation of 2017 regarding the activities of Park 
Strategies, the PGZ returned to cooperation with the lobbying corporation BGR. 
According to the new contract, the company had to provide the following ser-
vices:
— to advise the Polish holding on strategic communications with the US gov-
ernment, including on foreign policy, legislation and public policy;
— to represent PGZ interests in the USA and assistance in strengthening Pol-
ish-American military cooperation;
— to inform U.S. congressmen and the White House about the position of 
PGZ on various issues;
— to promote interests of PGZ regarding the development of the Polish “Wis-
la” air/missile defense system with the participation of several American com-
panies, as well as the “Khomar” program, which provides for the acquisition of 
three divisions of operational-tactical mobile missile systems from the American 
LMCO (range over 300 km)34.
It is very important that the development of the Polish armed forces under 
the “Wisla” and “Homar” programs provides partial localization of production 
in Poland that can give a powerful impetus to technological cooperation with the 
American military-industrial complex.
The lobbying of the BGR led to the conclusion of a number of arms trade con-
tracts from the United States. For example, in 2018 the US Congress approved 
the sale of “HIMARS” rocket launchers to Poland35. The Polish Ministry of De-
fense regarded the contract as “another breakthrough in building up the country’s 
31 Wypowiedzi na posiedzeniach Sejmu, Posiedzenie nr 28 w dniu 20.10.2016 (2. dzień obrad), 
Poseł Cezary Tomczyk // Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. URL: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/
Sejm8.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=28&dzien=2&wyp=076 (access date: 26.11.2019). 
32 Zapis przebiegu posiedzenia Komisji Obrony Narodowej 06.07.2018 // Sejm Rzeczypospo-
litej Polskiej. URL: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?skrnr=OBN-101 (access 
date: 26.11.2019). 
33 Kancelaria Sejmu, Biuro Komisji Sejmowych, Pełny zapis przebiegu posiedzenia Komisji 
Obrony Narodowej (nr 101). URL: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?skrn-
r=OBN-101 (access date: 26.11.2019).
34 Constilting Services Agreement between Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa S.A. and BGR 
Government Affairs. LLC. 20.11.2017. URL: https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5430-Exhib-
it-AB-20171120-63.pdf (access date: 30.11.2019).
35 2018 rok w modernizacji — Wisła i co dalej? [podsumowanie] // Defence24.pl. URL: 
https://www.defence24.pl/polityka-obronna/2018-rok-w-modernizacjiwisla-i-co-dalej-pod-
sumowanie (access date: 30.11.2019).
15V. N. Konyshev, E. M. Skvortsova
defense potential”. However, the mood of the department regarding the cost was 
not so optimistic: the price of the contract was called “relatively good”36.
In 2018 Poland signed one of the largest and most important contracts in the 
history of the country for the acquisition of American “Patriot” systems37, the 
main air defense elements that protect NATO and Europe from air threats. The 
Patriot Procurement Agreement is the first phase of the “Wisla” program for inte-
grated procurement of air/missile defense equipment38. Poland hoped to become 
the second country after the United States with a similar automated air defense 
system39. The deal is beneficial for Poland both from a military and economic 
point of view as it involves the creation of new high-tech jobs and the transfer of 
“Patriot” technologies to Polish defense companies for their production of key 
elements40.
The success of BRG lobbying for PGZ interests was reinforced by the signing 
of a letter of intent with the American company Raytheon, which establishes a 
strategic partnership between the companies. This cooperation enables the trans-
fer of technologies, as well as the participation of Polish industry in the design of 
BMD shield. In addition, the possibilities of developing radar and missile tech-
nologies with the participation of Polish industry are still under consideration. 
These prospects are of great importance for Poland in the light of the country’s 
focus on the creation of a national BMD system by 2023. This system should be 
able to complement the European BMD system and, if necessary, subordinate to 
NATO command [31, p. 52].
In the US Congress, the main focus of the lobbyists’ activity was to promote 
the decision on a permanent US military presence in Poland. In this regard a 
36 Nowoczesne i godnie wynagradzane wojsko i więcej współpracy sojuszniczej — 2018 
rok w Ministerstwie Obrony Narodowej // Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej. URL: http:// 
m.mon.gov.pl/aktualnosci/artykul/najnowsze/nowoczesne-i-godnie-wynagradzane-wo-
jsko-i-wiecej-wspolpracy-sojuszniczej-2018-rok-w-ministerstwie-obrony-naro-
dowej-i2018-12-31/ (access date: 30.11.2019).
37 Jaki będzie Fort Trump? Czy powstanie Agencja Uzbrojenia? [6 pytań na 2019 r.] // De-
fence24.pl. URL: https://www.defence24.pl/polityka-obronna/jaki-bedzie-fort-trump-czy-
powstanie-agencja-uzbrojenia-6-pytan-na-2019-r (access date: 01.12.2019).
38 Poland to acquire Patriot defense system, Agreement will create new defense industry jobs 
in U.S., Poland. URL: https://www.raytheon.com/news/feature/poland-signs-loa-for-patriot 
(access date: 01.12.2019).
39 Nowoczesne i godnie wynagradzane wojsko i więcej współpracy sojuszniczej — 2018 rok w 
Ministerstwie Obrony Narodowej // Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej. URL: http://m.mon.gov.pl/
aktualnosci/artykul/najnowsze/nowoczesne-i-godnie-wynagradzane-wojsko-i-wiecej-wspol-
pracy-sojuszniczej-2018-rok-w-ministerstwie-obrony-narodowej-i2018-12-31/ (access date: 
01.12.2019).
40 Raytheon i PGZ rozszerzyły współpracę // Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej. URL: 
http://m.mon.gov.pl/aktualnosci/artykul/najnowsze/raytheon-i-pgz-rozszerzyly-wspol-
prace-o2016-07-04/ (access date: 04.12.2019).
16 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
letter was sent to US Secretary of Defense James Mattis41. Lobbyists developed 
the ideas from seven MOCs who urged Mattis to pay attention to this issue42. 
As a result of joint efforts, two Polish-American working groups were created 
to increase the presence of American troops and to create a military base in 
Poland.
The letter from BGR contained several arguments. In particular, lobbyists 
pointed to the military strengthening of Russia on the borders of NATO’s East-
ern flank. The threat was associated with the intensification of military coop-
eration between Russia and Belarus, the buildup of the Russian military group 
near the northern border of Poland and in the Kaliningrad region, as well as 
with Russia’s “aggressive behavior” towards the Baltic states. Lobbyists paid 
particular attention to the vulnerability of the Baltic states, which could be 
quickly isolated from other NATO members in the Suvalki corridor. This idea 
was inspired by the results of the Russian-Belarusian “West-2017” exercises. 
An eloquent proof of Russia’s aggressive intentions was the “Russian inva-
sion” in the Crimea and the Donbas. Strategically, it was implied that Russia’s 
ambition was to split NATO. The lobbyists convinced the US government that 
these actions and intentions of Russia should receive a corresponding reaction 
from the United States in the form of deploying a permanent American military 
base on the Polish territory.
The lobbyists explained the advantage of strengthening military cooperation 
with Poland by the fact that the Polish state is the most reliable US ally in NATO. 
Unlike some NATO allies, Poland strictly fulfills its obligations to increase de-
fense spending in connection with the wishes of President Trump. Finally, Poland 
has a unique geostrategic position as the most eastern outpost of the West. In 
their view, a permanent US military presence will create the potential for a quick 
response to any threats from Russia.
Despite the efforts of lobbyists, the agreement was reached. Even Poland’s 
readiness to finance a project to create an American base, which the Poles had 
given the eloquent name of “Fort Trump”, didn’t help in negotiations43. Moreover, 
Poland saw a toughening of the US position suggesting a universal formula for 
calculating “Price + 50%”. This way the cost of deploying US forces in other 
41 Support Poland and Respond to Growing Russian Power on NATO Eastern Flank. Letter to 
Sec’y Mattis Asking for Dipper US-Polish Defense Cooperation, BGR Government Affairs. 
LLC. 06.26.2018. URL: https://s3.amazonaws.com/fara2.opensecrets.org/5430-Informa-
tional-Materials-20180626-7.pdf (access date: 04.12.2019). 
42  Szef MON rozmawiał w Waszyngtonie o współpracy wojskowej Polski i USA // polsat-
news.pl. URL: http://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2018-09-15/szef-mon-rozmawial-w- 
waszyngtonie-o-wspolpracy-wojskowej-polski-i-usa/ (access date: 04.12.2019).
43 Polsko-amerykańskie negocjacje // Polska zbrojna. 29.10.2018 URL: http://www.pol-
ska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/26776?t=Polsko-amerykanskie-negocjacje (access date: 
05.12.2019).
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countries was doubled44. But the final point in this project was the failure of the 
US Congress to vote the agreement45. At the same time, the United States indi-
cated that they were open for further discussion on the subject46. Thus, BGR only 
partially realized the tasks set for it.
Another important client of lobbying services was POLSA, whose activities 
focused on implementation of national space strategy published in 2017. The 
contract was signed with individual lobbyist John F. Hall-Jr. who provided con-
sulting on the development of US space policy and law in this field47. Formerly 
a NASA officer, Hall oversaw the export of space technology. During 2018 he 
organized meetings of the head of POLSA with the Executive Secretary of the 
National Space Council of the White House and NASA; consultations in the UN 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna; meeting with officers 
of the Vandenberg Air Force Base. During the meetings, the prospects of launch-
ing Polish satellites as part of NASA program to planet Mars, as well as the future 
visits of NASA scientists to Poland for deepen cooperation were discussed48.
Later, Hall helped to establishing more close contacts between NASA and the 
White House, including interaction on issues of the Joint Statement of Intent in 
space cooperation. He accompanied Poland’s participation in the International 
Space Symposium in April 2019 at the Paris Air Show in May 2019, and during 
meetings of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space49. Addition-
ally, Hall prepared reference materials about US space activities for POLSA and 
participated in television interviews.50. Collaboration with Hall helped POLSA 
44 Trump wanted five times more money for the deployment of US troops in other countries // 
Lenta.ru. 10.03.2019. URL: https://lenta.ru/news/2019/03/10/trmp/ (access date: 05.12.2019).
45 The US and Poland agreed to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank // Broadcasting Company 
of the RF Armed Forces «ZVEZDA». 11.05.2019. URL: https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_
mire/content/2019511647-lzuIl.html (access date: 05.12.2019).
46 Zwiększenie obecności wojsk USA w Polsce to większe bezpieczeństwo dla kraju i całego 
NATO, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej. URL: https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/
zwiekszenie-obecnosci-wojsk-usa-w-polsce-to-wieksze-bezpieczenstwo-dla-kraju-i-calego-
nato (access date: 05.12.2019)
47 Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration 
of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, for the six months ending June 
30, 2018 // U.S. Department of Justice, p. 201. URL https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/
file/1194051/download (access date: 10.12.2019).
48 Supplemental Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amend-
ed for Six Month Period Ending 11/30/2018. URL: https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6555-Supple-
mental-Statement-20190128—2.pdf (access date: 10.12.2019).
49 Supplemental Statement Washington, dc 20530 Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended for Six Month Period Ending 05/31/2019. URL: https://efile.fara.
gov/docs/6555-Supplemental-Statement-20190604-3.pdf (access date: 10.12.2019).
50 Supplemental Statement Washington, dc 20530 Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended For Six Month Period Ending 11/30/2019. URL: https://efile.fara.
gov/docs/6555-Supplemental-Statement-20191205-4.pdf (access date: 10.12.2019).
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prepare the signing in April 2019 of an agreement with the US Strategic Com-
mand on the exchange of data on events in space51 and significantly facilitated 
POLSA’s engagement with NASA.
The Ministry of National Defense of Poland also used the services of American 
lobbyists. An agreement for consulting services with BGR for a period of a year 
was concluded in February 201952 with the list of services including assistance 
in contacts with the US government, Congress, other government departments, 
the media, and the expert community. These consultations were designed to help 
Poland in the planning of military policy and to strengthen military-technical co-
operation with the United States. Lobbyists also pledged to advance the interests 
of Poland in Congress and US executive departments when necessary. The Min-
istry of National Defense of Poland committed to pay $ 70,000 per month, while 
BGR was obliged to submit monthly reports on activities and expenditures. Thus, 
the total annual cost of contract reached $840,000. Under this contract, lobbyists 
met with House representatives and their assistants. Among them were Democrat 
Philemon Vela (from the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protec-
tion and Security Technologies), as well as members of the Democratic Armed 
Services Committee John Garamendi, Rick Larsen, Joe Courtney and Republi-
can Mac Thornberry (head of the committee)53. In general, lobbyists got support 
from representatives of both parties, which helped to reach their goals in shaping 
decisions.
A feature of the 2019 contract was the promotion of Poland’s interests through 
American think tanks, universities, and business corporations. Active electronic 
correspondence was conducted with representatives of the Heritage Foundation, 
the Atlantic Council, the Carnegie Endowment, the Center for the Analysis of 
European Politics, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies. This practice does not seem accidental, as experts 
from these institutions are often invited to congressional hearings54. Among cor-
porations, lobbyists paid special attention to LMCO and Raytheon, which are 
Poland’s potential partners for deepen military-technical cooperation and joint 
production. 
51 Polska Agencja Kosmiczna podpisała porozumienie z Dowództwem Strategicznym USA o 
wymianie danych dotyczących zdarzeń w kosmosie (SSA) // Polska Agencja Kosmiczna. URL: 
https://polsa.gov.pl/wydarzenia/komunikaty/1014-polska-agencja-kosmiczna-podpisala-
porozumienie-z-dowodztwem-strategicznym-usa-o-wymianie-danych-dotyczacych-zdarzen-
w-kosmosie-ssa (access date: 12.12.2019).
52 Consulting Services Agreement between the Minister of National Defense for Republic 
of Poland and BGR Government Affairs. LLC. 09.02.2019. URL: https://efile.fara.gov/
docs/5430-Exhibit-AB-20190209-71.pdf (access date: 12.12.2019).
53 Supplemental Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as 
amended For Six Month Period Ending 05/31/2019. URL: https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5430-
Supplemental-Statement-20190630-39.pdf (access date: 12.12.2019).
54 Hearings. U.S. Policy Toward the Baltic States. March 22, 2017 // US House of 
Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs. URL: https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/
hearings?ID=63894FAA-968D-40C1-9F19-1B3A5F57B0E1 (access date: 12.12.2019).
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The lobbyists continued consultations on strengthening security on NATO’s 
Eastern flank, returning to the project of a permanent US military presence in Po-
land. As a result, in the summer of 2019 the US decided to increase the number of 
the American troops in Poland from 4,500 to 5,50055. The discussions on the most 
suitable place in Poland for the permanent deployment of the US Army armored 
brigade are continuing. Thus, quite a successful trend has been demonstrated in 
promoting Poland’s interests in military security, military-technical cooperation, 
and the development of joint space programs.
Conclusions
Polish efforts aimed at developing a strategic partnership with the United 
States remain a constant in its foreign policy, regardless of the ruling party. L&J 
places a relatively greater emphasis on military cooperation, viewing it as a lo-
comotive for developing a comprehensive partnership. In turn, CP believes that 
economic cooperation should be the top priority. In this sense, in the future, one 
can expect a decrease in lobbying activity in the case of CP coming to power, and 
growth in the case of L&J victory. 
Using the services of professional lobbying organizations allows Poland to 
gradually develop channels of influence in the US Congress, executive depart-
ments, American think tanks and defense industry enterprises. This provides Po-
land increased influence on decision-making in the United States in her favor, 
as can be seen in the example of the first steps to expand cooperation from the 
military to space issues. 
Initially Poland faced a number of difficulties in achieving goals through lob-
bying organizations. Among them are incorrect setting goals for lobbyists, irregu-
lar and insufficiently coordinated work with lobbying organizations, instability of 
their own foreign policy related to the specific policy of the L&J and CP parties 
when coming to power, an unfavorable conjuncture in the world policy prompted 
by the Obama administration changing the security agenda, and the later election 
of Donald J. Trump. And the last factor — Poland’s strong dependence on US 
policy — will continue to have a decisive influence.
Nevertheless, Poland’s lobbying of national interests in defense policy and 
military cooperation with the United States proved to be an effective instrument 
of foreign policy. Warsaw quickly learned the mistakes of its first steps: aban-
doned the stake on supporting only one party in the US Congress, moving on to 
the search for bipartisan support for its initiatives; learned to take a more flexible 
position in negotiations with the United States and attract not only government 
55 Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation Regarding United States Force Posture in the 
Republic of Poland // The White House. URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/joint-declaration-defense-cooperation-regarding-united-states-force-posture-
republic-poland/ (access date: 12.12.2019).
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bodies and ministries, but also specialized corporations as principals, all of this 
without weakening state control. It also improved coordination of lobbying activ-
ities and the work of traditional foreign affairs agencies and officials.
The practice of lobbying has contributed to the deepening of bilateral cooper-
ation in the military sphere, which has the following prospects directly affecting 
Russia’s security interests: military-technical cooperation, joint military produc-
tion, a permanent US military presence in Poland, building up NATO infrastruc-
ture and BMD elements. Poland uses the idea of Russian military threat to deepen 
ties with the United States, seeking to assume the role of the most important 
security partner on NATO’s eastern flank. However, in addition to close military 
cooperation, Poland also has a broader perspective - “spillover” cooperation to 
high-tech civilian sectors of the economy due to product localization, as seen 
from the first steps taken in establishing cooperation between Poland and the 
United States in the space industry.
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